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Abstract
Background: Person trade-off (PTO) elicitations yield different values than standard utility
measures, such as time trade-off (TTO) elicitations. Some people believe this difference arises
because the PTO captures the importance of distributive principles other than maximizing
treatment benefits. We conducted a qualitative study to determine whether people mention
considerations related to distributive principles other than QALY-maximization more often in PTO
elicitations than in TTO elicitations and whether this could account for the empirical differences.
Methods: 64 members of the general public were randomized to one of three different face-to-
face interviews, thinking aloud as they responded to TTO and PTO elicitations. Participants
responded to a TTO followed by a PTO elicitation within contexts that compared either: 1) two
life-saving treatments; 2) two cure treatments; or 3) a life-saving treatment versus a cure treatment.
Results: When people were asked to choose between life-saving treatments, non-maximizing
principles were more common with the PTO than the TTO task. Only 5% of participants
considered non-maximizing principles as they responded to the TTO elicitation compared to 68%
of participants who did so when responding to the PTO elicitation. Non-maximizing principles that
emerged included importance of equality of life and a desire to avoid discrimination. However,
these principles were less common in the other two contexts. Regardless of context, though,
participants were significantly more likely to respond from a societal perspective with the PTO
compared to the TTO elicitation.
Conclusion: When lives are at stake, within the context of a PTO elicitation, people are more
likely to consider non-maximizing principles, including the importance of equal access to a life-
saving treatment, avoiding prejudice or discrimination, and in rare cases giving treatment priority
based purely on the position of being worse-off.
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Preliminary results from this study were presented in a
poster session at the 2002 AcademyHealth Conference on
June 23, 2002, and final results were presented at the 25th
Annual Meeting of the Society Medical Decision Making
on October 2003.
Cost-effectiveness analyses (CEAs) show how to maxi-
mize the number of quality adjusted life-years (QALYs)
that can be obtained within a given budget – an approach
we refer to as "QALY-maximization." The United States
Public Health Service Panel on Cost Effectiveness recom-
mended three methods for measuring preferences in
CEAs: the rating scale, the standard gamble, and the time
trade-off elicitation technique [1]. Some people argue that
none of the three recommended preference measurement
techniques are particularly suited for capturing public
preferences in allocation or rationing contexts because
they support a distributive principle based on maximizing
treatment benefits, measured as QALYs, without regard
for who receives the benefits. People have described other
principles they believe are normatively important to
ensure a just distribution of healthcare treatments, includ-
ing the importance of giving: 1) more weight to patients
with a more severe health condition [2-4]; 2) equal weight
on saving the lives of people with or without disabilities
[4,5]; and 3) sufficiently high priority on treating patients
in clear need of beneficial treatments [6-10].
Nord has argued that, "the obvious way to make sure that
the QALY procedure captures social preferences for person
trade-offs is, of course, to use person trade-off exercises as
the basis for scoring health states in the first place" [[3],
page 201]. page 201 The person trade-off (PTO) prefer-
ence elicitation method was proposed to do just that
[3,11-16]. In traditional preference measurement meth-
ods, such as the time trade-off (TTO) and standard gamble
(SG), people are asked, typically from a personal perspec-
tive, to state their preference for a health state by imagin-
ing they are in that health state but could be returned to
perfect health if they lived fewer years (TTO) or won a
gamble (SG). In PTO elicitations, people are asked to
make tradeoffs between treating different groups of
patients who differ by a constellation of attributes. For
example, respondents might be asked how many patients
would need to be cured of moderate leg pain to be equally
good as curing 100 patients of severe shortness of breath.
The debate about the relative merits of traditional utility
measures versus the PTO measure is not merely a theoret-
ical one. Numerous studies have shown that preferences
elicited by traditional utility measurement methods can
differ significantly from those elicited by the PTO method
[3,14-21]. Differences are especially striking when lives
are at stake. For example, all else being equal, saving the
life of someone with a medical disability (e.g. paraplegia)
produces fewer QALYs than saving the life of someone
who can be returned to perfect health. However, public
preferences, as measured by PTO elicitations, place nearly
equal value on saving the lives of healthy people and peo-
ple with paraplegia [22-24].
Why do PTO elicitations yield preference values that are
different than values obtained using traditional utility
measures? Traditional measures elicit subjective expected
utilities for a health condition which are used to set prior-
ities based on principles of QALY-maximization (see for
example, Nord [16], Ubel [12], and Olsen [15]). Many
people believe that PTO elicitations, in addition to captur-
ing the underlying subjective expected utility for the con-
dition being evaluated, incorporate other distributive
principles. Indeed, Salomon and Murray demonstrated
how these "distributional concerns" could be derived as
weights separate from the "core strength of preference"
that is common across many elicitation methods [25]. We
conducted this study to gain insight into the factors peo-
ple consider when responding to PTO elicitations com-
pared to one traditional preference measurement method,
the TTO method. We used a think-aloud protocol in face-
to-face interviews in which we asked participants to state
their reasoning out loud as they responded to both types
of elicitations. Specifically, our goal was to determine
whether people mention considerations related to distrib-
utive principles other than QALY-maximization more
often in PTO elicitations than in TTO elicitations and
whether this could account for the empirical differences.
Methods
We recruited a convenience sample of participants from
the general public in and around a small Midwestern city
in the U.S. Venues included a nearby major metropolitan
airport, a local Laundromat, a Veterans Affairs Medical
Center, and we recruited some over the phone who
traveled on-site for the interview. Willing respondents
participated in a semi-structured interview that consisted
of one TTO elicitation, followed by multiple PTO elicita-
tions. We obtained participants' strength of preferences
for paraplegia, severe shortness of breath, and moderate
leg pain using both methods.
Elicitations
We started the interviews with a TTO elicitation, asking
participants to consider two friends, Mr. (Mrs.) Adams
and Mr. (Mrs.) Brown who were both 30 years old and
who would live with their health condition (e.g. perfect
health or paraplegia) for 50 more years, and then die in
their sleep. We matched the gender of the imaginary
friends to the gender of the participant. Participants
responded to one of two TTO elicitations – either making
tradeoffs between paraplegia and perfect health orPage 2 of 13
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We started off by asking which friend was better off and
then, assuming the respondent chose the friend with the
less severe condition, asked them to choose between one
friend living in the worse-off condition for 50 more years
and the other friend living for only a "few more days" with
the better-off condition. We chose a lengthy timeframe
(50 years) because we believed more participants would
willingly trade years over a longer time horizon compared
to a shorter time horizon [26,27]. Most TTO elicitations
use a personal perspective in which respondents are asked
to imagine themselves in the worse-off condition with a
chance for a cure if they are willing to live in perfect health
for a shorter period of time [28]. However, we used an
impersonal perspective (depicting the two friends)
because one study found that people were more willing to
trade years to improve quality of life with this perspective
while only marginally affecting overall values [29] and
another study did not find any differences in values when
they compared personal versus non-personal perspectives
[21].
After the TTO elicitation, participants responded to PTO
elicitations in which we asked them to imagine being "on
a panel of experts trying to decide between two different
medical treatments." We described two alternative treat-
ment programs (see the Appendix) and asked the partici-
pants, "Which would you choose or are the choices
equally good?" Participants responded to at least two PTO
scenarios (as shown in Table 1) in which they were asked
to choose between: 1) curing a life-threatening infection
in previously health people versus curing a life-threaten-
ing infection in patients with paraplegia; 2) curing a life-
threatening infection in previously healthy people versus
curing patients with a spinal cord injury to prevent para-
plegia; or 3) curing patients of severe shortness of breath
versus curing patients of moderate leg pain. Our intent
was to compare responses from the TTO and PTO elicita-
tions.
We assigned participants to one of three versions of a
structured interview. Table 1 highlights the TTO and PTO
comparisons that were the focus of each of the three
experimental groups. In the Save-Save group, our focus of
comparison was: 1) a TTO elicitation where participants
were asked to trade off years of perfect health versus living
50 years with paraplegia; and 2) a PTO elicitation that
asked participants to choose between saving the lives of
previously healthy patients or patients with paraplegia. In
the Cure-Save group, we compared: 1) the same TTO elic-
itation as the Save-Save group; and 2) a PTO elicitation
that asked participants to choose between saving the lives
Table 1: Interview Structure for the Three Experimental Groups
Elicitation Save-Save Group Cure-Save Life Group Cure-Cure Group
TTO Paraplegia v. Perfect Health Paraplegia v. Perfect Health Leg Pain v. Severe Shortness of 
Breath
PTO 2 Distractor PTOs 1 Distractor PTO 1 Distractor PTO
Cure life-threatening infection in 
previously healthy patients v. 
patients with paraplegia
Cure life-threatening infection v. 
Cure SCI1
Leg Pain v. Severe Shortness of 
Breath
Comparison & Reflection 
Questions
You have answered two different types of questions in this interview. Health policy experts use both types of 
questions to research people's opinions about treating illness and disability. Now I want to show you how 
your answers might be interpreted. I especially want to know what you think about these interpretations
In the first part of our interview, we compared Mr./Mrs. Adams and Mr./Mrs. Brown in a type of question 
called the Time Trade-Off. You said that if Mr./Mrs. Brown lived <indifference point> years in perfect health, 
that he/she would be no better or worse off than Mr./Mrs. Adams, who lived 50 years with <condition> A 
policy expert would interpret that you think one year of perfect health is about the same as <computed ratio> 
years with paraplegia. In other words, you think paraplegia is <computed ratio> times worse than perfect 
health. What do you think about this interpretation?
Later in the interview, you made a choice between curing some people of <condition1> or curing other people 
of <condition2> in a type of question called the Person Trade-Off. Based on your answer to the Time Trade-
Off question, a policy expert might assume you would say that <predicted PTO> people would have to be 
cured of <condition2> to make that choice as good as curing 100 people of <condition1>. Your actual answer 
was <PTO indifference point>.
Which number do you think is a better reflection of your thoughts: the number you actually gave for the 
person tradeoff or the one that was predicted based on your time tradeoff answer?
Do the time tradeoff and person tradeoff questions make you think about different issues?
1SCI = Spinal Cord InjuryPage 3 of 13
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injury to prevent paraplegia. In the Cure-Cure group, we
compared: 1) a TTO elicitation where participants were
asked to trade off years with moderate leg pain versus liv-
ing 50 years with severe shortness of breath; and 2) a PTO
elicitation that asked participants to choose between cur-
ing patients with severe shortness of breath and curing
patients with moderate leg pain. We did not want
responses to the PTO elicitation to be influenced by
responses to the TTO elicitation which was presented first.
To help mitigate this possibility, we first asked the partic-
ipant to respond to PTO "distractor" tasks that presented
two unrelated health conditions. We started interviews
with the Save-Save version of the interview first. We pre-
sented 2 distractor PTO elicitations to participants in this
group. Participants in the Save-Save group did not refer
back to the earlier TTO elicitation when responding to any
of the PTO tasks. We made a decision to reduce to a single
distractor task when interviewing the other two groups.
Again, in the other two groups, no one made a reference
to their earlier TTO response in any of the PTO tasks so we
felt that the single distractor task was sufficient.
Indifference point calculations
In the TTO elicitation, we used a "ping-pong" method
[30] to converge on an indifference point; the point at
which it was difficult to choose which friend was better
off. For example, a participant may have said that Mrs.
Adams, who was living with paraplegia for 50 years, was
just as well off as Mrs. Brown, who was living in perfect
health for 40 years. The utility for e.g. paraplegia can be
computed as:
Where U(h2) = utility for the health state being evaluated
(e.g. paraplegia); th1 = time spent in the less severe health
state (e.g. perfect health). In the example, we compute
U(h2) as 0.8 for paraplegia. A utility cannot be computed
for severe shortness of breath because participants traded-
off relative to moderate leg pain instead of perfect health
or death. In this context, the value is better regarded as a
"relative utility." Based on the TTO utility, we predicted a
PTO indifference point so we could compare this value to
their actual PTO indifference point:
In the example above, the predicted PTO indifference
point would be 125. This means that based on the partic-
ipant's TTO valuation, we expect the participant to be
indifferent between saving the lives of 125 people with
paraplegia and saving the lives of 100 non-disabled peo-
ple. We modified the predicted PTO indifference point
calculation for participants in the Cure-Save group
because the PTO elicitation compares curing a spinal cord
injury (to prevent paraplegia) versus saving lives. There-
fore, the denominator in Equation (2a) is substituted with
the utility for curing paraplegia rather than the utility for
the condition itself, as follows:
Continuing with the example above, the utility for curing
paraplegia would be 0.2 and the predicted PTO indiffer-
ence point for curing spinal cord injury (to prevent para-
plegia) would be 500. That is, we would expect the
participant to be indifferent between curing 500 patients
of spinal cord injury versus saving the lives of 100 non-
disabled people.
In the PTO elicitations, we asked participants how many
patients would need to be cured in the comparison group
(e.g. patients with moderate leg pain) to be equally good
as curing 100 patients in the baseline group (e.g. patients
with shortness of breath). The indifference point is the
number of patients that the participant said was needed in
the comparison group for both choices to be equally
good. The higher the indifference point, the lower the
value placed on curing the comparison group of patients
relative to curing the baseline group of patients. We used
an open-ended approach to obtain a PTO indifference
point rather than a search procedure because the response
range was open-ended. People could give as high a
number as they wanted. One option, in this situation,
might have been to use a titration approach but this
approach yields responses that are different depending on
the direction values are presented [31,32] and are differ-
ent than those obtained using a ping-pong procedure
[30]. Some participants were unable to state a number
without prompting, however. In this situation, we did use
a ping-pong approach using 6 billion (roughly equal to
the population of the world) as the starting point for the
high end and then used a procedure comparable to that
used in the TTO elicitation to narrow down to an indiffer-
ence point.
Qualitative data collection
Three trained interviewers used a verbal report method to
explore the thought process of participants as they
responded to the TTO and PTO elicitations. We used a
concurrent think aloud protocol accompanied by verbal
probing,[33] and asked participants to literally think
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and all thoughts [33-36]. We directed participants to "just
say out loud whatever is going through your mind as you
answer my questions, even if it seems obvious. There is no
right or wrong answer; we just want to hear how you think
about these issues." After the interviewer posed each ques-
tion, she reminded participants to think aloud as they
answered the question. We complemented this approach
with verbal probing, in which the interviewer prompted
participants to expand upon their "think aloud" state-
ments and/or to provide retrospective reports of their
thoughts to elicit more complete verbalization [37]. We
accomplished this by saying, for example, "Can you tell
me a little more about what you were thinking as you
came up with that answer?" We used these two methods
to produce a combination of concurrent and retrospective
reports which, when used together, provided a compre-
hensive description of participants' thought processes
[34].
After the participant responded to the TTO and PTO elici-
tations, the interviewer used the TTO response to predict
what the PTO indifference point would be for the corre-
sponding PTO elicitation. The interviewer presented this
prediction and the participant's actual indifference point
and asked the participant to reflect on the two values by
asking the questions listed at the bottom of Table 1. We
audio-recorded and created verbatim transcripts of every
interview.
Quantitative analysis
We compared demographic characteristics across the
experimental groups using analysis of variance for contin-
uous variables (i.e. age), and χ2 tests for categorical varia-
bles (Fisher's Exact Test for 2 × 2 comparisons) using SPSS
Release 10. We coded African American, Hispanic, Native
American, and Alaska Native participants as racial minor-
ities. We compared indifference points predicted from
TTO responses to actual PTO indifference points using the
Wilcoxon signed rank test for paired observations. We
also conducted a concordance analysis of qualitative
codes for the TTO and PTO elicitations using McNemar's
paired comparison tests.
Qualitative analysis
We conducted a descriptive analysis [38] of the verbatim
transcribed interviews. The authors read one-third of the
interviews (randomly chosen from each of the three
experimental groups) and independently listed themes
that arose from the readings. They consolidated themes in
a step-wise process (reading and coding in two batches of
transcripts) to create a final coding scheme. Once themes
and definitions were established, three judges (LJD, TRR,
CCG) continued reading through all of the transcripts
using the coding scheme to identify themes. We used a
consensus approach to resolve differences in coding
before proceeding to the next batch of transcripts.
Results
A total of 75 participants participated in the study. We
excluded a total of 11 (15%) participants: 2 interviews
were not recorded properly and could not be transcribed;
5 interviews were not completed because participants had
to catch their plane or go to their clinic appointment; 2
participants were confused about the questions and their
answers were uninterpretable; and 2 participants pro-
Table 2: Participant Demographic Characteristics
Save-Save Group (n = 
22)
Cure-Save Group (n = 
22)
Cure-Cure Group (n 
= 20)
Overall p
Minority Status N/A
Yes 27% 9% 20% 19%
Age – Range 19 – 53 19 – 85 20 – 80 19 – 85
Mean (SD) 33 (12.9) 45 (16.3) 42 (19.2) 41 (17.2) 0.100
Gender
%Female 46% 55% 50% 50% 0.834
Education – Range 9 – 21 11 – 19 12 – 21 9 – 21
Avg Years (SD) 16 (3.3) 15 (2.2) 16 (2.6) 15 (2.6) 0.411
Location N/A
Metro Airport 50% 0% 0% 17%
Laundromat 41% 46% 35% 41%
VAMC 9% 23% 30% 20%
On-site 0% 32% 35% 22%Page 5 of 13
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the "ultimate answer is that there is no answer" in
response to the TTO questions and that the PTO questions
were "disgusting...it's like, which child do you love more,
with big ears or the one with the small ears." The other
protester said that the comparisons presented in both the
TTO and PTO elicitations could never be equal. Of the 64
participants included in the analysis, 50% were female
and participants had an average of 15 years of education.
Table 2 shows participant demographics. Participants in
the Save-Save group were marginally younger than partic-
ipants in the Cure-Save and Cure-Cure groups. The Cure-
Save group had a 9% racial minority of participants, while
the Save-Save and Cure-Cure groups had 27% and 20%,
respectively. We were unable to test for statistical differ-
ences in minority representation because of low minority
counts in the Cure-Save group.
Seven themes emerged through our analysis of the tran-
scribed interviews. Table 4 lists the themes along with
illustrative quotes. We organized six of the themes into
whether they were consistent with the QALY-maximiza-
tion objective or not. The seventh theme differentiated
participants who responded from a personalized perspec-
tive, either in terms of their own experience or mentioning
other people they knew well who had experienced the
condition. These participants used this prior experience to
project what it would be like to live with the condition
under consideration themselves. The next three sections
present findings for each of the three groups.
Save-save group
The TTO elicitation reduced the number of years one
friend would have to live in perfect health to be equally
good as another friend who would live 50 years with par-
aplegia. We were interested in comparing responses to a
PTO elicitation that asked how many people with paraple-
gia would need to be cured of a life-threatening infection
to make them indifferent between curing that group ver-
sus curing 100 healthy people who had the life-threaten-
ing infection. Table 3 shows the median indifference
point predicted from TTO responses and the median
actual indifference point obtained through the PTO elici-
tation. The indifference point predicted from TTO
responses was significantly higher than that obtained
directly through the PTO elicitation. In the PTO elicita-
tion, the median participant thought that curing the life-
threatening infection in 100 people with paraplegia was
equally good as curing the life-threatening infection in
100 healthy people. However, based on participants'
responses to the TTO elicitation, we predicted that it
would take saving 130 lives of people with paraplegia to
be just as good as saving 100 healthy lives. In fact 91% of
participants placed equal value on saving the lives of both
groups when asked directly in the PTO elicitation but only
25% of TTO responses implied this value.
Why were the indifference points predicted from TTO
responses larger than those obtained directly through the
PTO elicitation? During the TTO elicitation, all partici-
pants voiced considerations that were consistent with
QALY-maximization principles and only one participant
mentioned a non-maximizing principle. In contrast, dur-
ing the PTO elicitation, less than half (45%) mentioned
QALY-maximization considerations, while two-thirds
(68%) mentioned non-maximizing principles. The domi-
nant consideration that emerged during the PTO elicita-
tion was the belief that the lives of the people being
traded-off were equal, regardless of pre-existing paraple-
gia. One man said, "I don't see leaning towards somebody
because they can walk, valuing their life more than some-
one that would be in a wheelchair...Based on this descrip-
tion there isn't anything that says that I should lean
towards one group or the other." Another man seemed to
intertwine consideration of equality on the basis of saving
a life and on the premise that the people with paraplegia
Table 3: Comparison of Predicted TTO and Actual PTO Indifference Points
Median (Interquartile Range) Indifference Points:
Group Predicted from TTO responses Actual Response to PTO 
elicitation
p6
Save – Save1 (n = 22) 130 (100–339) 100 (100–100) 0.001
Cure – Save2 (n = 22) 176 (100–583) 135 (100–3250) 0.320
Cure – Cure3 (n = 20) 323 (131-infin4) 650 (250-infin5) 0.736
1. The number of people with paraplegia whose lives would need to be saved to be equally good as saving the lives of 100 healthy people.
2. The number of people who would need to be cured of spinal cord injury to prevent paraplegia to be equally good as saving the lives of 100 
healthy people.
3. The number of people who would need to be cured of moderate leg pain to be equally good as curing 100 people of severe shortness of breath.
4. Participants in the 75th percentile believed that living 10 years with severe shortness of breath was equivalent to living less than a day in perfect 
health.
5. Participants in the 75th percentile believed that all the people in the world would need to be cured of severe shortness of breath to be equally 
good as curing 100 people of moderate leg pain.
6. Based on the paired comparisons using the Wilcoxon signed rank test.Page 6 of 13
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already living life rough, you know what I mean, and
then...not be able to save them?" Two participants wanted
to avoid any taint of prejudice that may arise by choosing
to cure the non-disabled group. One woman said, "I feel
like I'm going to be prejudiced by picking this individual
over that one." Another woman expressed strong emotion
when asked to choose between curing the two groups,
"Oh, this is horrible. This makes me feel like a bad person
or something. I think I would choose the non-paraple-
gia... but...it doesn't make me feel good about
myself...because these are people too and as many people
may love them, as love these people. They may even have
as many people dependent on them as these people." This
participant later said, "...it's not different enough from
saying 'Oh, well you're black or you're a woman or ... that
kind of impermissible difference.' I guess [the two groups
are] the same." Yet, this same participant was willing to
trade-off years of life in exchange for perfect health when
she responded to the TTO elicitation.
During the TTO elicitation, nearly half of participants
(45%) took a personal perspective, imagining what it
would be like to live in the condition themselves. Only
two participants did so in the PTO elicitation. One man
said, as he was responding to the TTO elicitation, "To have
something like that happen to me, me personally ... if you
only lived a day more. I wouldn't want to live like that" as
he thought about living with paraplegia. Yet, many of the
participants who personalized the scenario while
Table 4: Qualitative Themes and Illustrative Quotes
Themes consistent with QALY-maximization considerations:
Quality of life References to the condition's impact on quality 
of life. Could be a positive or negative 
comment on a societal or individual level.
TTO – "...it sounds to me like Mrs. Adams has 
... the more severe symptoms, and I would ... 
think that...it might impact her quality of life 
more."
PTO – "I would choose to cure the people who 
are severely short of breath because ... I think it 
so affects the quality of life, every move they 
make. ...People don't have to walk up hill, they 
can avoid doing that, they can drive, they can 
find some other means. ...I don't see that as 
being something that's completely disabling, 
whereas I see the severe shortness of breath as 
completely disabling."
Years of life Expresses the importance of choosing the 
option that maximizes the length of life.
TTO – "Probably the one that lives longer is in 
better shape..."
Non-health benefits Consideration of the choice that would result 
in the most benefit in terms of non-health 
dimensions such as contribution to society, 
economic contribution, employment, etc.
TTO – "Even though he might have less years 
to live, he's really capable of doing a lot more."
PTO – "I guess if you wanted to look at it 
really, really coldly you could say this group is 
consuming fewer resources ..."
Themes consistent with equity considerations:
Fair Chance Consideration of giving someone who is 
worse-off a fair chance even though the benefit 
may be less than the alternative.
... if ... the non-paraplegic versus the paraplegic, 
have same length of life span ... probably the 
quality of life would be a little better for the 
non-paraplegic. So therefore...I would cure...the 
paraplegics.
Equality of life Consideration of equal value of lives as a basis 
of moral judgement or to be fair.
If they're both living, it doesn't mean one's life 
is more valuable over the other.
Prejudice Specific mention of wanting to avoid prejudice 
or discrimination.
Now I feel like I'm going to be prejudiced by 
picking this individual over that one.
Self-Perspective Comments about self (or close-others) who 
have experienced the condition or projecting 
self into having the condition.
TTO – "...I would rather have pain on the leg 
than not be able to breathe properly."
PTO – "I think I would have to try to choose 
the ones with the shortness of breath. ... my 
son had asthma pretty bad, ... I could live with 
the leg pain but I don't think I could live with 
the shortness of breath."Page 7 of 13
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etal perspective in the PTO elicitation. The same man, as
he responded to the PTO elicitation later said, "...They're
already suffering...it's not fair to knock them off, you
know what I mean? It wouldn't be right, it wouldn't be
moral. If these people want to live like that, then you
know what I mean? More power to 'em [sic]." One
woman, after saying she'd prefer to live in perfect health
even less than a day rather than live with paraplegia for 50
years in response to the TTO elicitation said, "When I
think about having all your faculties up until the end, no
matter what that point it is, I just prefer [living less than a
day in perfect health]." However, later in the interview
during the PTO elicitation, she said, "it's...like choosing to
say who's life is more important – somebody who is fully
functional or a person who is not. So, to me it's equal."
Cure-save group
We presented the same TTO scenario to this group of par-
ticipants as presented to participants in the Save-Save
group. But the PTO scenario was different. The baseline of
comparison in the PTO elicitation was curing 100 healthy
people of a life-threatening infection and we asked partic-
ipants how many people would need to be treated for a
spinal cord injury to prevent the onset of paraplegia to
make them indifferent about which group to treat. We
found no significant differences between actual PTO
indifference points and those predicted from TTO
responses. During the PTO elicitation, the median partic-
ipant believed that treating 135 people with a spinal cord
injury to prevent paraplegia was equally good as saving
the lives of 100 healthy people. The median indifference
point predicted from TTO responses implied 176 people
with spinal cord injury would need to be treated to be
equivalent. Based on actual PTO indifference points, 45%
of participants believed that curing spinal cord injury was
at least as valuable as saving the life of a healthy person.
This stance was also implied by 41% of the indifference
points predicted from TTO responses.
When responding to the TTO elicitation, all participants
voiced considerations related to QALY-maximization
principles and most (68%) took a personalized perspec-
tive, as seen in Table 5. Likewise, when responding to the
PTO elicitation, most participants (82%) voiced consider-
ations consistent with QALY-maximization principles.
One man weighed length of life versus quality of life as he
responded to the PTO elicitation saying, "With the other
ones ... they're not in as good condition because ... they're
confined to a wheel chair, they're limited in what their
activities are...I think I would go with [curing] the infec-
tion, just because, the fact is, that could result in death.
These people [with paraplegia]: it would [be] nice to have
them cured, so they can get around leading a normal life
but without the treatment, they still are here ...They can
still lead some sort of a life." Many participants focused
on living with paraplegia compared to dying from an
infection as one man who said, "...You'd like to live as
long as you can...being paraplegic at least you're still on
the planet where you can laugh and you can enjoy life and
things like that" and a woman said, "So, at least they're
alive, where if we hadn't helped these people, in 48 hours
with this infection they would die."
Many participants in this group implied that living with
paraplegia was at least as bad as death by saying that living
less than one day with perfect health was equally good as
living 50 years with paraplegia as they responded to the
TTO elicitation. Some participants continued to reflect
this belief as they responded to the PTO elicitation by say-
ing that treating people with a spinal cord injury to pre-
vent paraplegia would be equally good as saving the lives
of healthy people. One woman said, "...Both result in
something totally life changing...because it results in
death, but this is just really bad too...They just
seem...equally as important..." This woman went on to
say, "...What if I were an emergency room doctor or some-
thing, and somebody came in with this infection [and]
somebody came in with this [spinal cord injury], which
one would I take first and help...Both result in something
totally life changing... [One] results in death, but this is
just really bad too, so I don't know. They just
seem...equally as important. Even though one results in
death."
Cure-cure group
The baseline of comparison for participants in the Cure-
Cure group was curing 100 people of severe shortness of
breath and we asked participants how many people
would need to be cured of moderate leg pain to be equally
good when responding to the PTO elicitation. The median
participant believed that 650 people would need to be
cured of moderate leg pain to be indifferent between treat-
ing the two groups when responding to the PTO elicita-
tion. The median indifference point predicted from TTO
responses implied that 323 people would need to be
cured of moderate leg pain to be equivalent. Despite the
seemingly large difference between the two values, it was
not statistically significant. The non-significance is likely
due to the exceedingly wide range of responses to both the
TTO and PTO elicitations. Participants in the 75th percen-
tile, when responding to the TTO elicitation, would rather
live less than a day in perfect health than live 50 years with
severe shortness of breath. Similarly, participants in the
75th percentile, when responding to the PTO elicitation,
believed that every possible person should be cured of
severe shortness of breath before anyone was ever cured of
moderate leg pain. On the other end of the spectrum, two
participants refused to trade any time in the TTO elicita-
tion and two participants refused to choose a group toPage 8 of 13
(page number not for citation purposes)
Population Health Metrics 2005, 3:10 http://www.pophealthmetrics.com/content/3/1/10treat in the PTO elicitation; both sets of cases implied that
curing either condition had equal value.
Our qualitative analysis revealed similar types of consid-
erations across the two types of elicitations. All partici-
pants voiced considerations consistent with QALY-
maximization when they responded to the TTO elicita-
tion. One woman said, "I think that the shortness of
breath would be...more suffering even though she's going
to live longer and die peacefully." Another woman said,
"I'd rather have pain in the leg than not be able to breathe
properly." Naturally, because the TTO elicitation asked
participants to trade-off years of life versus quality of life,
directly, many more participants mentioned the impor-
tance of length of life as they responded to the TTO com-
pared to the PTO elicitation saying, for example, "I think
that a 30-year-old would value having more years of life,
even if it involved having pain – daily pain."
All but one participant also voiced QALY-maximization
considerations as they responded to the PTO elicitation
too. One man said he would "still choose the shortness of
breath because those people cannot function and the peo-
ple with the leg pain can function; basically enjoy life with
a little pain." Qualitatively, several participants said they
wanted to be sure everyone was cured in the worse off
group before anyone in the group with the less severe con-
dition was cured. One man said, "The shortness of breath
is...more severe...Moderate leg pain,... just about every-
body has aches and pains. But that shortness of
breath,...that's scary. So, I'd rather see everyone cured of
the...shortness of breath." Another said, "I think that it
would be more important to me to cure shortness of
breath than to cure some moderate leg pain they may be
having. I don't know, maybe I'm wrong to think that even
six billion people, every person in the world had leg pain,
I still think that it'd be more important to help the people
with shortness of breath." A woman said, "To me it seems
comparable to eliminating the common cold versus like
getting rid of AIDS what would I choose? I would choose
getting rid of AIDS...People die from that, they suffer ter-
ribly whereas this leg pain, it's a drag but it doesn't affect
your whole life. Again, I would still cure one hundred and
let the six billion deal with it."
Three participants (15%) voiced non-maximization prin-
ciples while responding to the PTO elicitation, while none
did so when responding to the TTO elicitation. Two par-
ticipants specifically mentioned the importance of equal-
ity, but from different perspectives. One woman believed
that everyone should have equal access to treatment,
regardless of severity, "...Everybody is worthy of being
alleviated from that pain." But another participant felt
that everyone should have equal opportunity for a decent
quality of life, "I feel like no matter what number I come
up with for moderate leg pain, I'm gonna [sic] be left feel-
ing guilty about ... all these people I know still have short-
ness of breath and can't make it from the bedroom to the
bathroom". Another participant was concerned about
inappropriately discriminating against treating a patient
on the basis of their condition, "...They're both the same
age, so you have to look at them equally...It's...like dis-
Table 5: Percentage of Participants Coded for Each Theme
Percentage of Participants:
Group: Save-Save (n = 22) Cure-Save (n = 22) Cure-Cure (n = 20)
Topic TTO PTO p* TTO PTO p* TTO PTO p*
Topics consistent with QALY-maximization principles
Quality of life 91 36 95 55 100 95
Length of life 55 5 55 55 50 5
Non-health benefits 18 14 36 9 15 5
Overall: 100 45 <0.001 100 82 0.13 100 95 1.00
Topics not related to QALY-maximization principles
Concern for the worse-off 0 5 0 0 0 0
Equality of life 5 59 5 0 0 10
Prejudice 0 9 0 5 0 5
Overall: 5 68 <0.001 5 5 1.00 0 15 0.25
Personalized the Scenario 45 9 0.004 68 27 0.01 45 25 0.10
% who said the TTO and PTO questions were different questions
64 59 35
• Using McNemar's paired comparison test.Page 9 of 13
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that's going to die sooner,...if her death has nothing to do
with the condition."
Nearly half of participants took a personalized perspective
when responding to the TTO elicitation while only 25%
did so as they responded to the PTO elicitation. When
responding to the TTO elicitation, one man said, "I had
leg pain ... I know some people that have shortness of
breath and they can do a lot less than I can. They...might
not have problems with their legs or anything but they
can't...do anything. Walk a few steps, or else some of them
have to carry their tanks around, their air tanks. So really,
they're more hindered than...the person with the leg
pain." He brought out considerations from a societal per-
spective as he responded to the PTO elicitation saying,
"Well, it comes to a point, where would society be better
off ... where you can cure more of the leg pain people, and
then it would be more beneficial to society. I mean it
sounds a little cruel but, part of those people could help
take care of the people with severe shortness of breath."
Perceived differences between TTO and PTO responses
When we asked participants to reflect on the indifference
point we predicted from their TTO response compared the
actual indifference point they gave in response to the PTO
elicitation, we heard a wide spectrum of responses across
the groups. In the Cure-Cure group, only 35% of partici-
pants felt the two elicitations were asking different ques-
tions, as shown in Table 5. However, most participants in
the Save-Save and Cure-Save groups thought the elicita-
tions were asking different questions (59% and 64%,
respectively). One man said, "I think you still are worse
off with paraplegia, right? You are definitely worse off,
'cause like I said, there's [sic] things you can't enjoy... If
you're ... a politician or ... a public health person, I think
you should value life either way ... even though you're
worse-off with paraplegia." A woman said, "They're not
the same question...You're asking me in the first one what
is my perception of the illness...In that first question I
took it as how would I feel if I had that illness or how
would it affect me. Whereas this situation is asking me is
how I value the two subsets as people. And as people, I
value them equally. So one is a quality of life issue and the
other one is who is more worthy of saving. They're not
related at all." Some simply echoed one man who said, "I
know the numbers don't match, but even looking at them
now, I still would say the same thing." Some expanded a
bit more as one woman did, saying that her TTO response
was based on "Me personally...everybody doesn't think
like I do," but as she talked about the PTO elicitation she
said, "...One of the reasons is that both, without the treat-
ment they'll both die. That's why I said they were 50/50. I
couldn't decide to save one or the other... I had to pick
both."
Discussion
Based on our findings, non-maximizing principles
explain part of the empirical differences seen in previous
studies when values obtained from TTO responses were
compared to those obtained from PTO elicitations. How-
ever, it is clear that context drives the extent to which these
other principles come into play. Participants were clear in
their belief that, within the context of choosing between
life-saving treatments, having pre-existing paraplegia
should not be a consideration. Though many participants
took a decidedly personalized perspective when respond-
ing to the TTO elicitation, most did not carry this into the
PTO elicitation and instead took a decidedly societal per-
spective. Even participants who preferred living less than
a day in perfect health rather than live with paraplegia
when responding to the TTO elicitation said that it was
equally important to save the lives of both groups in the
PTO elicitation. People were consistent in taking an egal-
itarian approach in the sense that everyone has a right to
choose to live, regardless of their health condition. Our
findings align with Williams's fair innings argument based
on the belief that everyone deserves to live some normal
length of life [39] and confirm Nord's [14] theory that
people may feel free to make decisions about their own
life but be reluctant to make life decisions for others.
These findings are also empirically consistent with other
studies where the median participant placed equal (or
nearly equal) value on saving the lives of people with par-
aplegia or perfect health in PTO elicitations [22-24] and
the importance of giving patients equal access to care [40].
Indifference points predicted from TTO responses were
not significantly different from those obtained directly
through the PTO elicitation when participants traded off
curing spinal cord injury to prevent paraplegia versus sav-
ing a healthy life. Participants voiced considerations
related to QALY-maximization principles while respond-
ing to both the TTO and PTO elicitation and they rarely
mentioned other principles during either elicitation. Most
previous studies comparing the PTO method to other tra-
ditional preference measures framed choices in terms of
curing a less severe chronic condition than ones described
in our study, versus saving the lives of previously healthy
patients. In nearly all cases, contrary to our results, indif-
ference points were higher when obtained through a PTO
elicitation compared to those computed from a tradi-
tional utility elicitation method; this was true for the rat-
ing scale [18], visual analog scale [17], TTO [14,19,25],
and standard gamble [14,17]. One reason for the lack of
differentiation in our study may be because of the way we
framed the PTO scenario. Rather than curing a pre-exist-
ing condition, we presented an opportunity to prevent new
onset of paraplegia. Our findings do confirm a study done
by the European Disability Weights group in which a sub-
stantial number (43%) of participants placed equal orPage 10 of 13
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pared to saving the lives of healthy people [41]. These
findings may be related to the fact that the condition eval-
uated in the two studies (paraplegia or quadriplegia)
involves severely impaired mobility. In two other studies,
people also placed significantly less value on saving the
lives of patients who would suffer new onset paraplegia
compared to saving the lives of people with pre-existing
paraplegia [22,23]. In a follow-up study, when partici-
pants were encouraged to consider their own ability to
adapt to difficult situations, the relative valuation for a
life-saving treatment with new onset paraplegia increased
significantly [24]. This study provides qualitative confir-
mation that many people are focused on the initial
trauma of having paraplegia in the context of this kind of
elicitation. If people perceive the condition to be cured as
highly traumatic, they will focus on the "awfulness" of the
initial trauma such that, in the words of one of our partic-
ipants, "both result in something totally life changing"
when compared to the alternative of saving lives. There
may be a theoretical threshold where as the condition to
be cured becomes less severe, people focus on the imper-
ative of saving lives instead. In this context, people's
choices may become lexicographical when lives were at
stake: lives typically trump cures [14,17-19].
Nearly all participants voiced only considerations that
were consistent with QALY-maximization principles
when asked to trade off years (TTO) to live in a less severe
condition versus living longer with a more severe condi-
tion or when choosing which of two groups to cure (PTO)
of a non-life-threatening condition. Indifference points
predicted from TTO responses were comparable to indif-
ference points obtained directly through the PTO elicita-
tion. Some people think that more severely ill patients
should be given higher priority even if they gain less ben-
efit than treating less severely ill patients [4,18,19,22].
One study found that PTO valuations for curing patients
who were worse-off were higher than those obtained from
the rating scale [18]. Only one small-scale study com-
pared the PTO to TTO preferences within the context of
curing two non-life-threatening conditions. Dolan and
Green found, qualitatively, that participants most often
based their responses on what the difference in treatment
benefit was likely to be [42]. Many of our participants
expressed the belief that everyone should be cured of
severe shortness of breath before anyone moderate leg
pain was cured. As one participant stated, "if you've got a
pain in the leg you can take an aspirin. If you can't breathe
you can't breathe." Severe shortness of breath, the way we
described it, was exceedingly more severe than the moder-
ate leg pain we described. Taurek asserted that "the dis-
comfort of each of a large number of individuals
experiencing a minor headache does not add up to any-
one's experiencing a migraine" [[43], page 308]. In the
same vein, curing ever more people with moderate leg
pain doesn't take away the suffering of a single person
with severe shortness of breath. Several participants
expressed this sentiment and this may help explain our
findings. There may again be a threshold (working in the
opposite direction) beyond which, if the difference in
severity is pronounced enough, the PTO will result in
higher indifference points than would be predicted by the
TTO measure.
Nord [16] assumes that the PTO provides a social context
within which to obtain preference weights and Olsen [15]
maintains that the PTO implies social weights while the
TTO implies private weights. Another study found quali-
tative evidence that some participants took a societal per-
spective in a PTO elicitation [42]. Our results confirm
these assertions. Regardless of context, participants were
more likely to take a personal perspective when respond-
ing to the TTO compared to the PTO elicitation. This is in
spite of the fact that we framed the TTO elicitation from a
non-personal perspective; we asked participants to evalu-
ate two friends rather than imagine what it might be like
to live with that condition personally. On the whole, par-
ticipants in our study were still more likely to personalize
the TTO compared to the PTO elicitation.
This study has several weaknesses. The sample size was
small, with trends toward being unbalanced between the
groups with respect to age and minority status. The actual
indifference points are not generalizable because of the
small convenience sample. In addition, our sample was
limited to a Midwestern location in the U.S. The European
Disability Weights study found that preferences elicited by
a PTO scenario, similar to the one we presented to partic-
ipants in the Save-Save group, varied widely across five
European countries [41]. Additionally, we used a long
time horizon (50 years) in the TTO elicitation to encour-
age more people to trade time for improved quality of life.
However, indifference points may have been exception-
ally high because people were more averse to living such
a long time in the health condition being evaluated. This
phenomenon may have contributed the lack of differenti-
ation between TTO and PTO indifference points in two of
three of the treatment contexts in our study though others
have found differences in similar contexts. Despite differ-
ences in recruiting location, demographics, and structure
of the interview, participants were consistent in their ten-
dency toward taking a more personalized perspective
when responding to the TTO compared to the PTO elici-
tation, regardless of context.
Conclusion
When trading off groups of patients within the context of
PTO elicitations, respondents are more likely to take a
societal perspective than when trading time within thePage 11 of 13
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tion is framed in a non-personal way. Furthermore, when
lives are at stake within the context of a PTO elicitation,
people are more likely to consider principles other than
simply maximizing QALYs, including the importance of
equal access to a life-saving treatment, avoiding prejudice
or discrimination, and in rare cases giving treatment pri-
ority based purely on the position of being worse-off.
However, the extent to which these non-maximizing prin-
ciples are expressed depends on context.
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